ORIGINAL RESEARCH article
Front. Environ. Sci.
Sec. Environmental Policy and Governance
Volume 13 - 2025 | doi: 10.3389/fenvs.2025.1623520
Analysis of enterprise low-carbon technology innovation via a tripartite evolutionary game under dual supervision
Provisionally accepted
- Northeast Agricultural University, Harbin, China
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Enterprise innovation in low-carbon technology is essential for achieving carbon peak and neutrality goals. A thorough understanding of the evolutionary dynamics among the government, financial institutions, and enterprises is key to fostering low-carbon technology innovation. This paper develops an evolutionary game model involving the government, financial institutions, and enterprises engaged in low-carbon production and uses MATLAB to simulate evolutionarily stable strategies under different conditions. This approach enhances the understanding of stakeholder conflicts in low-carbon production, strengthens the dual regulatory framework, encourages enterprises to innovate in low-carbon technologies, and explores the interactions among these stakeholders. This paper analyzes both the direct influence of the government on the behavior of financial institutions and the combined influence of the government and financial institutions on enterprises. The research findings reveal the following: When the government implements green economic policies, financial institutions develop innovative green financial products to provide green financial services, enterprises engage in low-carbon technology innovation, and the system reaches an optimal evolutionary state. Under dual regulation, enterprise income and the initial willingness of the government and financial institutions to participate significantly influence enterprise behavior. The government should regulate enterprises' operating risk coefficient and the feedback coefficient of low-carbon technology innovation on social welfare, ensuring that they remain within reasonable limits, thus motivating enterprises to pursue low-carbon innovation and implement low-carbon production practices. Moderate government incentives and penalties can motivate enterprises to pursue low-carbon innovations, with subsidies proving more effective than taxes in reducing rentseeking behavior that exploits green financial dividends. This study provides effective strategies and insights for promoting low-carbon technology innovation with stakeholder participation and offers policy recommendations for strengthening the dual regulatory system.
Keywords: Low-carbon technology innovation, Low-carbon production, green finance, Dual Supervision, evolutionary game
Received: 06 May 2025; Accepted: 16 Jun 2025.
Copyright: © 2025 Zhao, Zhang and Wang. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
* Correspondence:
Dechao Zhao, Northeast Agricultural University, Harbin, China
Jinyuan Wang, Northeast Agricultural University, Harbin, China
Disclaimer: All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article or claim that may be made by its manufacturer is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.